Agent · /llms.txt SHA-256
Use Cases

Build from ground truth.

Fraud needs a faked location: an attacker can steal everything except where the real user is. Compliance needs a true one: sanctions, securities, and licensed markets all turn on where the user stands. Octet replaces guesswork with a hardware-signed predicate against the policy you set.

1

Location is law.

A sanctions screen runs on an IP address and a country code from a dropdown. A five-dollar VPN defeats it. Major IP geolocation databases disagree on the same address by an average of 620 kilometres. The largest sanctions fine in banking history was $8.9 billion (BNP Paribas, 2014). A recent one was $4.3 billion (Binance, 2023), and the CEO did prison time. OFAC violations are strict liability. Octet replaces the IP heuristic with a hardware-signed predicate over presence.

1.1

Sanctioned jurisdiction blocking

71M people in sanctioned jurisdictions live within 100 km of a non-sanctioned border, and IP lookups miss by several times that distance. Octet attests directly to the device's presence relative to the named polygon set.

Predicateoutside(sanctions_set)
The problemStrict liability: intent is no defence, and firms have lost their licence to operate.
1.2

National exclusion: blocking the United States

SEC Regulation S requires a reasonable belief that the buyer is outside the US. IP geolocation does not meet that standard. Self-attestation does not either. KYC proves identity at signup, at real conversion cost, never that the buyer was outside the US at the moment of the trade.

Octet issues a hardware-signed proof before the session opens, covering Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the US Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands. Verifiable offline. Retained for audit.

Predicateoutside(us_polygon)
The problemA single non-compliant US sale is an unregistered securities sale on its own: strict liability, rescission, SEC exposure.
1.3

State-by-state activation

A single platform can serve only the jurisdictions where it holds authorisation, or where federal preemption has been judicially confirmed. The geofence updates without a client release as state injunctions issue or lift. The same primitive supports county-level and municipal carve-outs, and tribal land where gaming compacts apply.

Predicateinside(state_polygon)
The problemRun in a state that hasn't licensed you and it reads as unlicensed gambling — cease-and-desist orders, fines, removal from the state.
1.4

Sub-political zones: prisons, schools, stadiums

Octet supports polygon definitions at any scale, from a single building to a campus to a stadium bowl. The same cryptographic guarantee as a national geofence. Operators publish their polygons; any compliant app honours them.

Predicateoutside(restricted_polygon)
The problemA wager from inside a barred zone lands on the operator.
A regulator asking for evidence gets a signed predicate.
2

The credentials match. The location does not.

Account takeover, impersonation, synthetic identities: every fraud begins somewhere the real user is not. Generative AI has industrialised the attack; the defence is a fact that cannot be copied. The proof is passive, generated on the device with no extra screen or code, so security stops costing conversion.

2.1

Account takeover (invisible login)

Octet runs on the customer’s enrolled phone, alongside your existing auth: when the phone is present at the login, your app skips the push, the SMS code, the "was this you?" prompt.

Benjamin signs into his bank and the credentials check out. When those credentials are stolen and used from Myanmar, his phone is still in Chicago, with him: the login and the trusted device are not colocated, the proof fails, and the real Benjamin never sees a challenge.

Predicatecolocated(device, login)
The problemAccount-takeover defenses punish real users: step-up checks drive 15–20% session abandonment, and false declines cost roughly 9× the fraud.
2.2

Business email compromise · multi-sig wire approval

A large wire moves on a few sign-offs, and a sign-off is often an email. Octet binds each approval to a signed proof that it came from an enrolled device of an authorized signer, standing in one of your offices. The BEC attacker in Romania fires the same request with compromised credentials and cannot produce that proof. For high-value transfers, require two signers, each proven present.

Predicatedevice ∈ finance_signers · within(100m, office_sites)
The problem63% of orgs hit by BEC · ~$130K average loss per incident
2.3

Invoice fraud · supplier verification

Invoices that carry a signed proof the sender's device is at the supplier's registered address get fast-tracked. An attacker in Vietnam compromises your supplier's email and sends a fake invoice. Their device cannot produce a proof for the supplier's address. Flagged before payment.

Predicatewithin(5km, supplier_address)
The problem44% of companies hit by invoice fraud
2.4

One person, one account

Every signup carries a signed proof: this is a real phone, and here is where it is. A fraud ring spins up 1,000 accounts. Emulators and data-centre bots fail the first check: no real hardware to sign with. A farm of real phones clears that, then fails the second: all 1,000 proofs place the devices at one place. No honest cohort signs up 1,000 times from a single spot. Flagged before the bonus pays out.

Policynew_device, "genuine_device", "colocation_count:[<N per location]"
Outputunique_user: NO
The problem~15% of iGaming revenue lost to multi-accounting. 26% of accounts fake.
2.5

The remote engineer who isn't where they claim

You hire a remote engineer. They pass the interviews, say they're in Austin, and you grant repository and wallet access. They are actually working from a sanctioned jurisdiction through a US-based laptop farm, a pattern the FBI has flagged across hundreds of firms. Octet binds a continuous, hardware-signed proof of where the device actually is, checked at onboarding and on every sensitive action. The proof fails, and access never opens.

Predicatenot_in([DPRK, IR, RU, BY, CU, SY])
The problemHire one operative posing as a remote dev and a sanctioned actor holds your code and keys, and every paycheck is a strict-liability OFAC violation.
The attacker is somewhere else.

Every era trades trust for proof.