OctetVerdict
The outcome of a predicate call. Returned by isWithin, isOutside, contains on OctetSdk.loc.
Shape
public struct OctetVerdict: Sendable {
public let result: Result
public let reason: ReasonCode
public let message: String
public let proof: LocationProof?
public let validity: Interval?
public let queriedAt: Date
public let confidence: ConfidenceSummary
public let achievableLevel: ProofLevel? // non-nil only when reason == .insufficientPrecision
public enum Result: Sendable, Hashable {
case yes, no, indeterminate
}
public enum ReasonCode: Sendable, Hashable {
case ok
case noFix
case futureTime
case staleFix
case noProofAtResolution
case insufficientPrecision
case attestationFailed
case mockLocationDetected
case sdkNotRunning
case notYetReleased
case invalidSessionNonce
case invalidDecisionRef
case invalidDecisionTime
case spoofingDetected
case tampering
case regionUnresolved
case permissionRequired
case invalidCallerContent
case callerContentNotEnabled
case licenseInactive
}
}
data class OctetVerdict(
val result: Result,
val reason: ReasonCode,
val message: String,
val proof: LocationProof?,
val validity: Interval?,
val queriedAt: Instant,
val confidence: ConfidenceSummary,
val achievableLevel: ProofLevel? = null, // non-null only when reason == INSUFFICIENT_PRECISION
) {
enum class Result { YES, NO, INDETERMINATE }
enum class ReasonCode {
OK, NO_FIX, FUTURE_TIME, STALE_FIX, NO_PROOF_AT_RESOLUTION,
INSUFFICIENT_PRECISION, ATTESTATION_FAILED, MOCK_LOCATION_DETECTED,
SDK_NOT_RUNNING, NOT_YET_RELEASED, INVALID_SESSION_NONCE,
INVALID_DECISION_REF, INVALID_DECISION_TIME, SPOOFING_DETECTED, TAMPERING, REGION_UNRESOLVED,
PERMISSION_REQUIRED, INVALID_CALLER_CONTENT, CALLER_CONTENT_NOT_ENABLED, LICENSE_INACTIVE,
}
}
Field invariants
proofisnil/nulliffresult == .indeterminate/INDETERMINATE. Enforced as a precondition /requireat construction. AYESorNOalways carries a proof. AnINDETERMINATEnever does.validityis non-nil exactly whenproofis non-nil. Both move together.queriedAtis theatTimethat was passed in. Echoed back so callers do not have to thread it themselves.confidenceis always populated, even forINDETERMINATE(with an empty summary in that case). Since 3.1 it holds neutral values. Seeconfidence.achievableLevelis non-nil only whenreason == .insufficientPrecision. It names the best proof level the SDK could reach for this query right now. New in 1.1. The SDK never falls back to this level automatically.
Near a border between two subdivisions, a device whose accuracy area crosses that border can only be proven at the country level. A subdivision query returns insufficientPrecision with achievableLevel country, and a policy that accepts only one of the two subdivisions sees the device as unknown, not as inside or outside. See Regions.
result
| Value | Meaning |
|---|---|
.yes / YES |
Predicate holds. Proof attached. |
.no / NO |
Predicate provably does not hold. Proof attached. |
.indeterminate / INDETERMINATE |
SDK cannot answer. See reason. |
Never collapse .indeterminate to .no silently. See Verdicts for the rationale.
reason
| Code | Result | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
ok / OK |
YES or NO |
Proof covered atTime. Predicate evaluated cleanly. |
noFix / NO_FIX |
INDETERMINATE |
SDK started but no fix yet (also: running on simulator / emulator). |
futureTime / FUTURE_TIME |
INDETERMINATE |
atTime is in the future beyond ±2 s clock-skew tolerance. |
staleFix / STALE_FIX |
INDETERMINATE |
atTime falls outside the validity window of any cached proof. |
noProofAtResolution / NO_PROOF_AT_RESOLUTION |
INDETERMINATE |
Cached proof is too coarse for the query (country proof, city query). |
insufficientPrecision / INSUFFICIENT_PRECISION |
INDETERMINATE |
Conditions cannot support the requested precision. Read achievableLevel. |
attestationFailed / ATTESTATION_FAILED |
INDETERMINATE |
Device attestation did not pass. |
mockLocationDetected / MOCK_LOCATION_DETECTED |
INDETERMINATE |
OS flagged mocked location. |
sdkNotRunning / SDK_NOT_RUNNING |
INDETERMINATE |
Octet.start(...) was never called or session ended. |
notYetReleased / NOT_YET_RELEASED |
INDETERMINATE |
Predicate path declared by the API but not available in this SDK build. |
invalidSessionNonce / INVALID_SESSION_NONCE |
INDETERMINATE |
Supplied sessionNonce is empty or exceeds 512 bytes. No proof is produced. Added in 1.2. |
invalidDecisionRef / INVALID_DECISION_REF |
INDETERMINATE |
Supplied decisionRef exceeds 256 characters. No proof, no network call. Added in 2.0. |
invalidDecisionTime / INVALID_DECISION_TIME |
INDETERMINATE |
A query with decisionRef set was pinned to a past atTime. A decision ref asks for a fresh proof, so it can't answer a past moment. No proof, no network call. Leave out decisionRef to ask about a past time. Added in 2.0. |
invalidCallerContent / INVALID_CALLER_CONTENT |
INDETERMINATE |
Supplied content breaks a rule (see Content), or a file can't be read or is over 64 MiB. No proof is produced. message names the rule. Added in 3.1. |
callerContentNotEnabled / CALLER_CONTENT_NOT_ENABLED |
INDETERMINATE |
You passed content, and caller content isn't enabled for your license. No proof is produced. Added in 3.1. |
permissionRequired / PERMISSION_REQUIRED |
INDETERMINATE |
A permission the SDK needs, such as location, isn't granted. The SDK doesn't ask for it: request it in your app and try again. Added in 2.0. |
licenseInactive / LICENSE_INACTIVE |
INDETERMINATE |
Your license was withdrawn or expired while the session was running. No proof is produced. licenseStatus.state says which: revoked or expired. Added in 3.1. |
spoofingDetected / SPOOFING_DETECTED |
INDETERMINATE |
The spoof pipeline flagged the fix. Adversarial. Added in 2.0. |
tampering / TAMPERING |
INDETERMINATE |
Device-integrity tampering (root / hook). Also an attached debugger or native tracer outside a sandbox session. Android refuses these since 3.0, as iOS already did. Adversarial. Added in 2.0. |
regionUnresolved / REGION_UNRESOLVED |
INDETERMINATE |
A country or subdivision predicate could not resolve the region at the required confidence. Since 3.0, also a pinned claimedRegion that is not an assigned ISO 3166 code. A benign measurement gap, not a detected spoof. Added in 2.0. |
Adversarial and benign reasons
Added in 2.0, the measurement-related INDETERMINATE reasons split into two classes so a policy layer can treat them differently. The remaining reasons come from the calling code or the SDK build:
- Adversarial (a detected forgery or compromise):
spoofingDetected,mockLocationDetected,tampering,attestationFailed. A policy layer should deny these. - Benign (the SDK could not measure):
regionUnresolved,insufficientPrecision,noFix,staleFix,futureTime,noProofAtResolution. A policy layer can permit these with a step-up.noProofAtResolutionmeans the proof on hand is too coarse for the question: ask again, or ask at the level the proof covers. - Caller or availability (fix the call, not the device):
sdkNotRunning,notYetReleased,invalidSessionNonce,invalidDecisionRef,invalidDecisionTime,invalidCallerContent,callerContentNotEnabled. None of these is adversarial. Fix the calling code rather than stepping up the user. - Permission and license:
permissionRequiredmeans your app must ask for the permission.licenseInactivepoints to your license, not to the user or the device.
Both classes carry no proof. The distinction is in the reason, not the result.
message
message is a free-form string for log lines and debug UI. Its wording can change between SDK versions. Use reason for control flow, not message.
proof
LocationProof is the signed protobuf that a verifier checks against Octet's public keys. Its full shape is part of the protocol, not the SDK's public surface. See Serialization for the v1 alpha caveat about how LocationProof is currently rendered through .toJson().
For most integrators the proof is opaque. Forward it to your verifier as-is.
The assurance tier
LocationProof.spoofingVerdict is the proof's assurance tier. Since 3.1 it is UNSPECIFIED, and the answer is result. If your license includes the tier, it reads VERIFIED (independent evidence supports the fix) or PLAUSIBLE (the fix is consistent with your query but not independently corroborated), also as spoofing_verdict in the proof JSON. A disc query (contains(...) or a disc isWithin(...)) applies its tier rule either way. See Predicates.
validity
The interval over which the underlying proof answers the predicate as stated. It does not predict how long the verdict will stay true. See Time Semantics.
public struct Interval: Sendable, Hashable {
public let from: Date
public let to: Date
}
data class Interval(val from: Instant, val to: Instant)
Inclusive-inclusive, from <= to.
confidence
ConfidenceSummary is always present. Since 3.1 it holds neutral values (a score of 0 and empty lists), and .toStr() prints no conf=. Act on result and reason, with no threshold to pick. overallScore, spoofingRiskScore, sensorContributions and flags are deprecated and are removed in 4.0.
If you need more device intelligence or your own scoring logic, Octet offers it as a custom feature or license.
See also
- Verdicts. Why the trichotomy matters.
- Time Semantics. How
validityandqueriedAtinteract. - Serialization.
.toStr()/.toJson()/.toJsonl()on verdicts.